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Abstract 
 
This paper talks about the modalities of Chinese human resource development (HRD) 
support to Africa, and the case of Tanzania. Since the hold of FOCAC from the new 
century, China has engaged a lot in the field of student scholarship, short term training, 
school building, Confucius Institute and university cooperation in Africa. The fieldwork 
in Tanzania also found the practice evidence of most of these approaches. The practice 
featured in some ways which are quite different from the Western aid modalities- it is not 
professional aid; it is not keen on direct budget; and there is a trend of one-to-one 
institutional cooperation. Although Tanzanian people in the field interviews are not quite 
interested in talking and comparing about those differences, they did show a willing to 
know and experience China’s education and training based on their different feeling 
towards China. It is hard to put this Chinese aid into any emerged aid model, which may 
motivate people to think wider about the meaning of education in the current global 
political economy.  
 
 
1. FOCAC and its promises on education 
 
Since the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
announced a strengthened relationship between China and Africa, there has been 
increasing interest about what that may mean for the forms and consequences of Chinese 
aid. Under this context education has been considered as a part in the FOCAC policies. 
Chinese government made an emphasis on government scholarships, vocational and 
applicable technological education, training and language teaching (FOCAC, 2006), and 
these educational actions are closely related with other principles on China‘s policy - as 
China has a view of human resource and social development that covers education, health, 
culture and people-to-people exchange and collaboration (King, 2007: 338).  
 
The FOCAC is held every three years since 2000, representing a more systematically 
framed partnership between China and Africa. In June 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao 
stressed that the Chinese Government would endeavour to shape a new Sino-African 
partnership based on long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit, and On 12 January 
2006, the Chinese government released China‘s African Policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the PRC, 2006) which declared the country‘s future aims and practice plans in Africa, and 
also made the specific field of practice clearer. Education as a part is included into the 
African Policy and each FOCAC Action Plans.  
 
Look back to the 2006 and 2009 (the latest) FOCAC pledges and what they have 
promised and achieved (which will be shown in the following table), it could be seen that, 
Chinese government has kept making effort on education and also on how expand the 
imoact of their educational support to Africa. The key changes and progress between 
2006 and 2009 FOCAC could be listed as follows: (1) 2006 Beijing Action Plan (BJAP) 
decided to build 100 rural schools for Africa, and this has been achieved by 96 schools 
until 2009; the plan of building ‘rural schools’ was transferred to ‘build 50 China-Africa 
friendship schools’ in 2010-2012 in 2009 Sharmel Sheikh Action Plan (SSAP);  (2) 
Increasing number of government scholarships were promised to be given to Africa, and 
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this number has been achieved 4,000 by 2009 (doubling the number of 2006) and aim to 
5,500 by 2012 (FOCAC, 2009b); The number of scholarship recipients increased by 700 
year-on-year both in 2007 and 2008 and by 600 in 2009 (ibid); (3) Training was 
mentioned in both FOCAC plans as part of HRD as well as education- China has trained 
over 10,000 African professionals in various fields under the African Human Resources 
Development Fund (AHRDF) by 2006, and said in 2009 that until the end of 2009 the 
government would has ‘trained for African countries over 15,000 professionals in 
business, education, health, science and technology, culture, agriculture, poverty 
reduction, customs, quality inspection, telecommunications, environmental protection, 
maritime affairs and media’ (FOCAC, 2009b); the SSAP promised to increase this 
number, to train 20,000 people in various sectors between 2010-2012 (FOCAC, 2009a). 
It was emphasized in the educational field that China would make ‘intensify efforts to 
train teachers for primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa, and help African 
countries train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers over the next three years since 
2010 (ibid); (4) Continue to promote the development of Confucius Institutes (CIs). It 
was said in 2009 implementation that 23 Confucius Institutes or classrooms have been 
opened in 16 African countries including Egypt, Benin, Botswana, Togo, Zimbabwe, 
Cameroon, Kenya, Liberia and Rwanda, helping African countries with the teaching of 
the Chinese language (FOCAC, 2009b), but the number of the instates has not been 
promised on 2009 SSAP (FOCAC, 2009a); (5) New plan on university cooperation 
emerged- 2009 SSAP proposed the implementation of the ‘20+20 Cooperation Plan for 
Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education’ to establish ‘a new type of one-to-
one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese universities (or vocational 
colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational colleges)’ (FOCAC, 2009a).  
 
It could be more proper to talk about Chinese educational aid to Africa under a wider 
range – the HRD support, as the training plans are not only within the formal university 
education (for academic degrees) range, but also within a wider conception of education, 
particularly the short term training. Thus this paper would like to call all these modalities 
as Chinese HRD aid to Africa, and this paper wants to make two point more clearly: 
firstly, the modalities of Chinese HRD aid we examined in Tanzania (related to the 
FOCAC pledges); and secondly, the key features especially the different features Chinese 
aid has from the Western aid. Finally it may give some implication when we think about 
it more deeply, in terms of the logic of donors.  
 
 
2. Overview of China-Tanzania HRD practice under the FOCAC pledges 
 
A fieldwork was conducted in Tanzania as an empirical part of my PhD study. Semi-
structured interview was chosen to collect different people’s perception of Chinese aid. 
These participants include officials from Tanzanian ministries and Chinese embassy in 
Dar es Salaam, as well as institutional leaders in Dar es Slaam Institute of Technology 
(DIT), Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE) and Benjamin Mkapa 
High School. DIT has a long history of cooperation with Chinese embassy in Dar es 
Salaam and the institute has quite a few lecturers trained in China; DUCE was 
negotiating with Chinese embassy for establishing a Confucius Institute at the fieldwork 
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time; and the Mkapa School has a Chinese Culture Centre (more like a library) with 
books and pictures donated by China.  
 
The table below shows the general situation of China-Africa educational cooperation and 
the overall practice or practice planned in Tanzania, as well as the practice particularly 
investigated in my fieldwork. The general modalities of the Chinese aid in Africa, as 
summarised from both documentary resources and my fieldwork data, include (1) 
government scholarship, (2) short-term training, (3) cultural exchanges, (4) Confucius 
Institute, (5) school building and donation, (6) teacher secondment, and (7) university 
cooperation.  
 
Chinese government does not provide details of the financial commitment or amounts it 
promised to African countries on each of these approaches. This unclarity may be for 
three reasons. Firstly, as we will show below, China’s aid does not come in the form of 
cash, or cost calculable projects. The dominant aid modality is scholarships and no 
figures are available on the cost of each scholarship, for instance, university income for 
overseas scholars. In effect, only the cost of building is easily obtainable, and this is 
shown in the table below. The second reason is the more general one that Chinese aid 
delivery channels are fragmented across several government ministries or institutions. 
The main authority is the Ministry of Commerce, but various other governmental bodies 
such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National 
Defence, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Embassies, and the State 
Council are involved in the decision making process (Pehnelt, 2007: 2; Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa, 2009: 19). Thirdly, according to Pehnelt (2007: 2), as well as the 
problem of fragmentation, analyzing the size and quality of China’s aid program is not a 
trivial task because of a fundamental lack of transparency.  
 
In the educational field, aid and cooperation plans are always carried out by Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Commerce, in accordance with Chinese Embassies and 
authorised Chinese universities. The amount budgeted for China-Africa cooperation on 
higher education and research programmes since 1995, is 10 million RMB (about 1.53 
million USD) budget, within which 60%-70% is for staff and 30%-40% for teaching 
facilities (PKUCAS, 2005: 28). The FOCAC pledges showed the numbers of the 
commitments, for instance, scholarships and schools that China promises (which can be 
seen in the following table) but not the financial statistics. In terms of scholarships, 
figures recently published by the China Daily show that China increased the total finance 
of government scholarships to 6.5 billion RMB in 2010 (about 0.99 billion USD) which 
includes the finance for African students (China Daily, 01/02/2010). Summing the living 
cost component (the only cash delivered to students) of each scholarship enables us to 
make a rough calculation of the level of investment involved. The allocations are 1,400 
RMB for undergraduate students monthly, 1,700 RMB for master students monthly, and 
2,000 RMB for PhD students monthly (ibid). This adds up to about 72,000 RMB (about 
11,076 USD) for the living cost of a PhD study and 61,200 RMB (about 9,415 USD) for 
a Master study (both are 36 months) in China.
1
 More specifically, as we see in the Table 
                                                 
1
 The tuition fee, accommodation fee and some travel grants are paid by Chinese government. The cash in 
the above calculation are given to students for living and study.  
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below, China planned to allocate 72 scholarships to Tanzanian students in 2011. If we 
assume that the average cost of these may be close to the cost of the Masters support, 
1,700 RMB monthly, that adds up to a total of around 1,468,800 RMB (about 225,969 
USD) per year for scholarship support to Tanzania. 
 
Table:  China's HRD aid to Tanzania related to the general situation 
 
Aid 
approaches 
General situation 
(FOCAC pledges) 
Tanzanian situation My fieldwork  
Government 
scholarship 
Achieved 4,000 by 
2009 and aim to 
5,500 by 2012 
(FOCAC, 2009b)  
Main approach, keep 100 
Tanzanian students in China 
every year under ‘Cultural 
Agreement’ and some extra 
numbers  as a ‘follow up of 
FOCAC 2006’(Embassy of 
the PRC in the United 
republic of Tanzania, 2009a); 
Chinese universities and 
colleges will enroll 72 
Tanzanian students for 
bachelor, master and doctor 
degrees in 2011 (Xinhuanet, 
2011) 
In Tanzania, 
officials from both 
of Chinese 
Embassy in 
Tanzania and 
Tanzanian Ministry 
of Education 
confirmed and 
introduced this way 
(as the main 
approach of 
Chinese 
educational aid) 
and its procedure 
Short-term 
training 
 
Annual training for 
educational 
officials, heads and 
leading teachers of 
universities, 
primary, secondary 
and vocational 
schools in Africa 
(FOCAC, 2006)
2
 
Not showed specifically on 
official documents 
This way was also 
confirmed and 
introduced by 
officials in Chinese 
Embassy. Principal 
of DUCE attended 
a short term 
training in China in 
2007; In China, 
ZJNU lecturers 
showed me their 
three-year training 
summaries 
Cultural 
exchanges 
(related 
education) 
The FOCAC 
pledges included 
‘to promote cultural 
exchanges’ 
(FOCAC, 2006; 
2009a); and 
Cultural Agreement between 
China and Tanzania (the 
implementation programme 
has been signed every four 
years; latest one is for 2009-
2012); Mkapa Cultural 
The principal and 
secretary of Mkapa 
School showed me 
the room and 
donated books of 
Chinese Culture 
                                                 
2
 It was added in the 2009 SSAP that, there would be 200 middle and high level African administrative 
personnel on MPA programs in China in three years; China would help African countries train teachers for 
primary, secondary and vocational schools and train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers over the next 
three years (FOCAC, 2009a).  
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planned to hold the 
FOCAC Culture 
Forum in future in 
2009 Action Plan 
Centre has been reported 
frequently on Chinese media 
Centre 
Confucius 
Institute 
Up to October 
2010, there were 21 
CIs in 16 African 
countries, and 5 
Confucius 
Classrooms in 5 
African countries 
(Hanban, 2010) 
Planned but not yet built in 
Tanzania; Nanjing University 
of Information Science & 
Technology (2009) indicated 
the prospect of establishing 
CI in University of Dar es 
Salaam (UDES) in 2009
3
 
In DUCE, it was 
confirmed by the 
principal that a CI 
plan was in the 
draft stage between 
DUCE and Chinese 
Embassy but not 
established yet
4
 
School 
building and 
donation 
Planned to build 
100 rural schools in 
2006-2009 and set 
up 96 by 2009 
(FOCAC, 2009b);
5
 
aim to build 50 
China-Africa 
friendship schools 
by 2012 (FOCAC, 
2009a) 
 
Mkapa High School- 
computers, piano and books 
donated by China; Msoga 
Primary School - the first 
China-aided primary school 
hailed in Tanzania in January 
2011 with total cost of 5 
million RMB (about 
750,000USD) (Xinhuanet, 
18/01/2011)
6
 
The principal of 
Mkapa School 
talked about 
donation from 
China 
Teachers 
secondment 
Mentioned as an 
approach by 
PKUCAS (2005) 
book but not as a 
main approach in 
FOCAC policies
7
 
Chinese side provides DIT 
with two micro-computer 
teachers (Embassy of the 
PRC in United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2008a) 
The principal of 
DIT talked about 4 
previous Chinese 
experts dispatched 
to DIT, and 2 
current Chinese 
teachers teaching 
                                                 
3
 According to Nanjing University of Information & Technology (31/12/2009), the Secretary of the 
university signed the Memorandum of Understanding with vice-chancellor of UDES, Mukandala, on 14
th
 
December of 2009. The two sides showed the interest on building CI. Chinese ambassador Liu Xinsheng 
also encouraged the university to enter into Tanzania and establish CI.    
4
 This CI should be as same as the one mentioned by Nanjing University of Information & Technology 
(ibid). DUCE is a constituent college of the UDES. 
5
 The aim was to build 100 rural schools in Africa (in BJAP) (FOCAC, 2006). Up to November 2009, 
according to FOCAC’s (2009b) ‘Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit’, the 
teaching equipment for the 30 schools have been delivered and the construction of 91 out of the 96 schools 
has started, of which 66 have been completed. Construction of the remaining five will start by the end of 
this year. 
6
 According to Xinhuanet (18/01/2011), the school was constructed by the Beijing Construction 
Engineering Group Co. Ltd. Msoga Primary School is one of the three primary schools China promised to 
build in Tanzania under the action plan of the Beijing Summit. 
7
 The book ‘China Africa Education Cooperation’ (2005) (in Chinese) reviews China-Africa cooperation on 
education, including the history, performance, problems and prospects. It is edited and written by the 
Centre for African Studies of Beijing University (PKUCAS), entrusted by the Department of International 
Cooperation and Exchanges, the Ministry of Education of PRC. 
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in the institute (but 
they were absent 
for vacation during 
my fieldwork) 
University 
cooperation 
The ‘20+20 
Cooperation Plan’; 
Two MPA (master 
of public 
administration) 
programs for 
developing 
countries in Peking 
University and 
Tsinghua 
University with the 
participation of 42 
students from 16 
African countries in 
2009 (FOCAC, 
2009a) 
Agreement on the 
cooperative project of higher 
education between the 
Ministry of Education of 
PRC and the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and 
Higher Education of 
Tanzania was signed in June, 
2000 (Embassy of the PRC in 
the United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2008b); ‘20+20’ 
between UDES and East 
China Normal University
8
 
DIT principal 
spoke about the 
collaborative 
project with Xi’an 
Jiao Tong 
university on a 
Highway and 
Transportation 
Engineering 
Laboratory  
 
 
3. Features and differences? 
 
What we want to get from the above table is not only the diverse modalities of Chinese 
aid, but also the features which may differ from the Western donors’ action. The 
conception of ‘aid modality’ here refers to the means and mechanisms by which aid is 
provided, and how funds and knowledge are transmitted to recipient countries (Ohno and 
Niiya, 2004: 3).  
 
In terms of the Western context, from the new century, there has been increased use of 
the term ‘new aid architecture’ (Farrington and Lomax, 2001) which refers primarily to 
from donorship to ownership, from Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) to Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSP), from project funding to Sector-Wide 
Approaches (SWAPs), and these are still in the evolution. Later according to Ohno and 
Niiya (2004: 7), there have been three shifts towards to a new aid modality. The first shift 
is from ‘stand-alone’ projects to project ‘clustering’, often in the form of pooling funds. 
The second shift is from structural adjustment operations to General Budget Support 
(GBS) under the PRSP agenda. Third, some donors, particularly British Department of 
International Development (DFID), have moved from SWAp to GBS, based on the view 
that GBS is a ‘preferred’ or more ‘progressive’ aid modality. 9  It is interesting to 
summarise China’s position and aid modality features within the process of these shifts. 
                                                 
8
 See more explanation in the following section. 
9
 According to Farrington ed. (2001), a SWAp is the process by which funding for a sector – whether 
internal or from donors – supports a single policy and expenditure programme under government 
leadership, and thereafter adopts common approaches across the sector.  
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The exploration of the fieldwork data helped us find out more evidence about how aid 
has been and is provided by the Western and Chinese donors. The main differentiating 
characteristics of China’s aid modality are as follows: 
 
(1) China does not ‘do’ ‘professional aid’. In what has been described as its ‘technocratic 
frame’ (Kothari, 2005: 443), Western aid is typically delivered through bureaucratised 
and professionalised consultants and specialist agencies and organisation, often 
competitive between NGOs, and between countries, and prone to corruption.  This is one 
of the main reasons for criticisms of Western aid.  Differently, China has little delegation 
to, or participation/ involvement of local actors, and puts considerable emphasis on direct 
constructions by Chinese engineers, or direct transferring and sharing its own experience 
as a developing country. This has been subject to other criticisms, referring to the limiting 
of learning opportunities for developing countries.  
 
Same in the educational field, when we go back to the problem of the aforementioned 
financial commitment issue, it can be seen that China does not so concern with evaluating 
how recipient countries manage the money hence there is much less accountabilities of 
recipients. There is no central foreign-aid agency (an institute such as DFID of UK), 
although there is a Department of Aid to Foreign Countries under Ministry of Commerce 
of the PRC. Beijing often designates different ministries (or, in some instances, provinces) 
to tackle different projects in different countries (Davis and Woetzel, 2010).   
 
Within this ‘un-professional’ aid relationship, while building schools and offering 
scholarships are not in themselves special forms of aid approaches (these approaches also 
can be seen in Western aid), in terms of Chinese aid, these forms are related not with 
accountabilities but with reciprocities. It is hard to define Chinese schools or scholarships 
as a kind of project aid, as in the Western idea of project aid, in the sense that ‘the project 
approach is based on the identification of a specific area of intervention for donor 
involvement, and the targeted use of funds for specific activities for which the objectives, 
outputs and inputs required to achieve them have been defined’ (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 
3). China carries out the education and training but does not intervene to evaluate how 
well they have been implemented. Individual recipients are evaluated by the university 
educational system when they are in China, but are not required to show they have used 
scholarships properly to any aid agency in China. The point/motive of China is creating a 
basis for long term trade and other exchanges.  
 
(2) China is not keen on ‘cash aid’. China does not finance the Tanzanian Ministry of 
Education or give big amount money to the schools directly. This is also indicated by 
Brautigam (2009: 124): 
 
… a growing trend in the West, where donors have begun to believe that a 
relatively well-governed country should be able to make its own decisions 
about how to use foreign assistance. Although the Chinese are aware of this 
trend, they are not following it. They rarely give cash aid in any significant 
amount.  
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And as she says, don't mistake the cash aid to be a donation. China also likes donating 
some goods to schools (such as they did to Mkapa School in Dar es Salaam with the 
computers and books, etc.). According to Brautigam (2009: 125), the difference is a 
normal grant-in-kind with a value in Chinese currency, while a cash grant will normally 
be announced with a value in US dollars. Moreover, donations also make for good 
pictures in the media, which build a nice image of China in Africa (just as the Cultural 
Centre and the donated pictures and books do).  
 
There is not yet any evidence of China joining in the trend of moving to ‘new aid 
modalities’ such as giving money directly to the recipient government with the Western 
donors who are still the main bilateral and multilateral donors in Africa. In Tanzania, the 
efforts for educational achievements were made by both national ministries and 
international (bilateral and multilateral aid) partners/donors. Within a process of seeking 
aid harmonisation (among donors and between donors and GoT) and reduction of the 
transaction costs (increasing aid effectiveness) and replication of policies, the aid 
modalities of Western donors have been moving from project funding to basket funding, 
and more recently, towards the direct GBS (however each donor has their own plans on 
aid strategy; for instance, when a pooled fund was established by a group of bilateral 
donors, DFID had already started general budget).  
 
In the primary educational field, despite some donation of teaching facilities we 
examined in the fieldwork, it seems China still focuses on building schools – from rural 
schools to friendship schools, which it also constructs itself; in the higher educational 
field, China focuses on government scholarship and university cooperation. Again it 
gives the completed project, not ‘money’ and ‘assistance’. The government is not 
interested in becoming involved in managing aid flows, but in building a good image of 
China and a long term relationship with Africa through human resource development 
support.  
 
In the higher educational field, the fieldwork data in Tanzania clearly showed me that, the 
most impressive modality of Chinese educational aid is the government scholarships. As 
shown in the table, government scholarship is also the important part in educational 
principles in the FOCAC pledges. The exploration of the situation of Chinese 
government scholarship in Tanzania started from enquiries at the Chinese embassy, as the 
‘diplomatic’ characteristic is key and even overhead of the educational issues within this 
practice. The embassies play a key role in China’s foreign aid policy. They are the main 
channel of providing aid - embassy staffs negotiate with recipient governments, define 
the specific requirements, and frequently implement the projects (Pehnelt, 2007: 2).  
 
(3) China likes to build ‘brother’ universities.10 Continued with Chinese focus on higher 
education mentioned above, it should be emphasized here that, one important feature of 
                                                 
10
 The ‘brother’ here is used by this paper, just for describing the one-to-one relation between Chinese and 
African universities. It is a new strategic partnership under the China-Africa ‘win-win’ slogan rather than 
the previous China-Africa socialist ‘brother’ relationship which meant more about the alignment against the 
capitalism and colonialism.  
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Chinese aid modality is a trend towards building one-to-one relationships between 
universities, either by organising short-term training, or by establishing CIs. The 20+20 
Plan in 2009 FOCAC documents particularly emphasised this again. This plan is said to 
‘establish a new type of one-to-one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 
Chinese universities (or vocational colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational 
colleges)’ (FOCAC, 2009a).11 King (2010) exactly pointed out this distinctive modality:  
 
A further distinguishing modality of the Confucius Institute and Classroom is 
that each of these bodies overseas is formally linked to an appropriate 
university or secondary school in China. This partnership then provides the 
source of the Chinese co-director of the Confucius Institutes in Africa as well 
as of the regular and volunteer teachers of Chinese to go to the African 
university. The Chinese partner can also become the host for the different 
scholarship and other language visitors to China (King, 2010: 82). 
 
Apart from the scholarships offered by diverse Chinese universities, one-to-one 
university cooperation plays an important part in enlarging China-Tanzania cooperation. 
As we have found on ground in Tanzania, DIT has a long history with Xi’an Jiao Tong 
University (in Xi’an, China) since 1990s. Under the agreement between the PRC and the 
United Republic of Tanzania in 1991, a collaborative project between Xian Highway 
University (Xi’an Jiao Tong University, China) and Dar es Salaam Technical College 
(currently DIT) was set up to develop a Highway and Transportation Engineering 
Laboratory. In 1993, the laboratory was established through ‘generous assistance’ from 
China.  The main objective of this project was to strengthen the DIT’s highway section 
by providing equipment, experts and training staff in the field of Highway and 
Transportation Engineering. Four experts from China were dispatched to DIT to assist 
their counterparts in technology transfer. The experts helped manage to install equipment 
in the lab and to teach in the highway engineering field.
12
 
 
The practice that happened after my fieldwork shows a trend of strengthened university 
cooperation between China and Africa, especially with the involvement of one of the top 
Chinese universities- East China Normal University (ECNU) (in Shanghai, China) which 
is collaborating with UDES under the 20+20 Plan. UDES signed Memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) with Nanjing University of Information and Technology in 
December 2009; East China Normal University (ECNU) signed cooperation MoU with 3 
Tanzanian universities: Nelson Mandela University of Science and Engineering (in 
Arusha), Tanzanian National Education Research Institute and UDES in March 2010 
(ECNU, 05/03/2010); Moreover, ECNU and UDES built one-to-one cooperation under 
20+20 plan (Xinhuanet, 28/06/2010).  
 
                                                 
11
 It was also emphasised in 2009 Action Plan that ‘the two sides proposed to implement a China-Africa 
joint research and exchange plan to strengthen cooperation and exchanges between scholars and think tanks 
of the two sides through a variety of ways, such as seminars, mutual academic visits, and joint research 
projects.’ (FOCAC, 2009) 
12
 This historical information is from the document given to me by the vice principal of DIT. The 
document’s title is Support to DIT extended by the Peoples Republic of China to DIT since 2002’. 
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Above all, Chinese aid appears with the characteristics of ‘un-professional’ with direct 
‘project’ (different from the Western project management), not in direct finance but a lot 
in human resource support such as scholarships, as well as one-to-one university 
cooperation. It is in a reciprocity system rather than in an aid system. Although it is not 
under the track of the Western aid towards to the ‘new aid modalities’ as in fact, the term 
‘new modalities’ is mainly within the Western context and discourse, it doesn’t mean 
China still stay the same as it has been. Rather say China is moving to any new modality, 
it may be more proper to say, China has never been in a traditional logic of aid as 
Western donors have defined. It is changing in another way, mainly based on China’s 
development motives and its role in the world. Cash aid or GBS may not be suitable for 
Chinese reality, thus the support of human resource (the diverse forms of education) 
appears to be especially important for the China-Africa relation.   
 
 
4. Recognitions and implications 
 
The three points stated above are within a special Chinese model of aid, or Chinese 
‘donor logic’ of aid.13 Whatever what we summarized here, however, are these features 
realized by people who are related to aid practice? The fieldwork aimed to seek people’s 
perception of Chinese educational aid, and whether the differences between Chinese and 
Western aid can be recognized. The result of the exploration showed that, from the side 
of recipient, actually, the recipients (either an individual who got the Chinese government 
scholarship before or a leader/lecturer from an institution) are not keen on talking about 
the differences between Chinese aid and Western aid – the diplomatic politics are far 
away from their life; however, most of the recipients showed their interests in Chinese 
scholarships, trainings and CIs, especially, they are interested in how China get the rapid 
development in recent years and what useful knowledge they can get for personal career 
or for institutional development and cooperation. From the side of Chinese government, 
the official people from the Chinese Embassy in Dar es Salaam confirmed the main aid 
modalities which are as similar as what mentioned on FOCAC policies (this can be seen 
in the aforementioned table), and stated that China realized the changes of the history and 
the socialism brothers’ time passed already hence China wouldn’t confront or replace any 
Western donors’ positions in Tanzania. Some key recognitions of Chinese aid modality 
are as follows: 
 
Firstly, despite donations and constructions to schools, Chinese government is aware that, 
rather than providing a big amount of money, one of the best choices more suitable for 
current capacity of China is the support of human resource - training African people in 
China with long term study for degrees or short term workshop for skills and experience. 
The Chinese media likes to use a proverb from Lao-Tzu to describe China’s logic of 
educational assistance for Africa: ‘Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach 
him how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime’. Moreover, when both parties depend on 
                                                 
13
 According to my PhD thesis, the ‘donor logic’ refers to (or we can say, it is researchable according to) 
an assemblage of aid categories including ‘what is given’, ‘why aid’, ‘conditions of aid’, modalities/ 
paradigms of aid’, ‘technocratic frame of aid practice’ and ‘aid relationships’.  
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the fish, the ‘teaching’ approach seems more meaningful. The Chinese choice of aid 
modality can be seen from the interview of Chinese Ambassador in Tanzania: 
 
For our aid project, the advantage is, we can control the whole process, such as 
building the national sport stadium or the hospital or the schools. Tanzanian 
does not have to control the money so we can use the budget very efficiently. 
We say we devote 0.1 billion, but the money is in Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce. We have our own construction team and we give Tanzanian the 
finished product. Normally our speed is incredible for Tanzanian. And on the 
other hand, compared with Western team, we have less labour cost. … But we 
have some other problems. In very few cases, we built the things they did not 
need, and another problem is, how to maintain the product. For example, if we 
build a hospital for them, then do we also need to offer them the medical 
materials and even doctors? We then may be involved into more and more 
issues. So the Western donors may have realised the problem during the recent 
years, and started to give direct financial support. But China will still maintain 
this approach at the moment, and see if we can make it more scientific. The old 
brothers’ relation will be instead by a new relation with more consideration of 
the market and mutual benefit. 
 
Secondly, the help for HRD in Africa is recognised as an important approach by our 
interviewees. From the fieldwork data we could see the Chinese scholarships are 
acceptable, and we also could see a number of returning students who obtained degrees in 
China now working at a good job in Tanzania. However, there are both positive and 
negative opinions on the details of the practice, which shows that China still needs to 
improve its practice such as the quality of higher education. Instead of building a friendly 
image for African people, for instance, a cultural centre in a high school which is eagerly 
looking for some donation of school construction rather than ‘cultural friendship’, it is 
better to work on their urgent needs in education, either the needs for school teaching or 
construction, or the needs for more communication and strict evaluation in higher 
education from the African students in China.  
 
The third point is the recognition of the difference between China and the West. It can be 
seen that the Chinese officials translate their policy claims into practice, and the Chinese 
media and websites also point to their good performance in the training of African 
university administrators. Both of these show China providing unconditional and equal 
support for African countries. However, in the fieldwork we felt while the older 
generation seems to have more passion in their Chinese friendships through the historical 
link, the younger generation may not be interested in any political comparison of 
different donors. Even some current institutional leaders also noted that they would 
accept any donation from any type of donor, when the resource could be of help. When 
asked if they know why they choose to study in China or why they want to learn Chinese, 
or why they feel happy with the workshops taken in China, the answer is they feel related 
with Chinese – within the activities organised by China, they can get what they are 
interested in, but maybe cannot easily obtained from the West: some feeling of sharing 
experience and ideas for development; and some activities which are more like exchange 
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rather than help. It could be seen that these recognition actually are not directly related to 
different aid modalities, but related to a different aid relations. 
 
Based on this, it is interesting to see how the so called ‘recipients’, in the traditional aid 
discourse, are in a kind of way of starting considering themselves as ‘clients’ in the 
neutral sense of the term when they are dealing Chinese aid. This is maybe the basic 
reason for these returning students considering the differences between China and the 
West, as they haven’t felt been donated, but been educated and trained within two 
countries’ non-postcolonial relation (in which they have seen economic/trade relation 
between countries rather than accountabilities and responsibilities that tie the donors and 
recipients). This situation help us consider: we perhaps are entering into a market-based 
aid, clearer than the so called donors-recipients aid. Moreover, can this different relation, 
motive and logic basis make a better quality of HRD aid especially producing mutual 
benefits in a long run? China still needs improvement on its practice. A reciprocity basis 
can reduce hierarchical feeling, but may also bring quite pragmatic aspiration on trade 
business rather than the realities of education and training.  
 
Finally, although on the basis of the main arguments of this paper and my PhD study, I 
have been able to show that China’s aid modality may have some differences from the 
Western aid, this conclusion is reached on the basis of an assumption of the ‘normality’ 
of the Western framework or logic of aid. It is very hard to frame China into any Western 
modality type, as Chinese aid is not about doing stand-alone projects or directly financing 
in order to reduce transaction costs, nor about giving more or less ownership to recipient 
countries, or whether they should intervene into African countries’ governance issues. It 
is even not just about promoting global educational development. The aim seems very 
pragmatic- ‘win-win’, particularly economic ‘win-win’. As King (2010: 86) concluded, 
‘ultimately all the many elements of China’s cooperation with Africa are inseparable 
from the political, economic and trade engagements with Africa’. This may remind us 
that it may not be appropriate to put China into any category of ‘aid modality’, because it 
is not like Western ‘aid’ from the beginning. This blended model of aid, investment, trade, 
and technology as levers for development, while less common in Western approaches, 
embeds education into the wider and more complex political economic context.   
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